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Summary 
The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08) requires implementation of positive train 
control (PTC) on railroads which carry passengers or have high-volume freight traffic with toxic- 
or poisonous-by-inhalation hazardous materials. PTC is a communications and signaling system 
that has been identified by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as a technology 
capable of preventing accidents caused by train operator or dispatcher error. PTC is expected to 
reduce the number of accidents due to excessive speed, conflicting train movements, and engineer 
failure to obey wayside signals. It would not prevent incidents due to trespassing on railroads’ 
right-of-way or at highway-rail grade crossings, where the vast majority of rail-related fatalities 
occur. 
Under RSIA08, PTC is required on about 60,000 miles of railroad track by December 31, 2015. 
Many railroad companies are uncertain of their ability to fully implement PTC by this deadline. 
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) estimates full PTC implementation will cost 
approximately $14 billion. Although the larger freight railroads are well along in planning for 
PTC, some smaller railroads and commuter lines have not yet identified sources of funding for 
implementation. 
PTC uses signals and sensors along the track to communicate train location, speed restrictions, 
and moving authority. If the locomotive is violating a speed restriction or moving authority, on-
board equipment will automatically slow or stop the train. A more expansive version of PTC, 
called communications-based train control (CBTC), would bring additional safety benefits plus 
business benefits for railroad operators, such as increased capacity and reduced fuel consumption. 
However, CBTC is not currently being installed by any U.S. railroad, due to the additional cost 
and to uncertainty about implementation of PTC before the 2015 deadline. 
Two bills introduced in the 112th Congress, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century 
Act (MAP-21; S. 1813), as approved by the Senate, and the American Energy and Infrastructure 
Jobs Act (H.R. 7), approved by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, would 
have extended the deadline and made other policy changes. No language relating to PTC was 
included in the final surface transportation bill (P.L. 112-141) enacted on July 6, 2012. However, 
existing law requires the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to report to Congress about 
the status of PTC implementation by December 31, 2012. If it wishes to reexamine the PTC 
mandate, possible options for Congress include 
• postponing the implementation deadline; 
• considering whether to make dedicated radio spectrum available to the railroads 
for PTC implementation and, if so, how to compensate current license holders of 
that spectrum; 
• examining possible alternatives to PTC and their potential to create barriers to 
competition in the rail freight market; and 
• providing federal financial support for PTC implementation by making PTC 
projects eligible for funding under the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement 
Funding Program or by appropriating other funding to FRA, as authorized in 
RSIA08. 
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Introduction 
Following several high-profile train accidents, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act 
of 2008 (RSIA08; P.L. 110-432), which mandated positive train control (PTC) on many passenger 
and freight railroads by December 31, 2015. The law does not describe PTC in technical terms, 
but defines it as a risk mitigation system that could prevent train accidents by automatically 
stopping trains when a collision or derailment is imminent. 
While PTC promises benefits in terms of safety, its implementation entails substantial costs and 
presents a variety of other policy-related issues. These include the interoperability of individual 
railroads’ systems, sufficient radio spectrum to support PTC, and the possibility that PTC could 
be a barrier to market entry. 
Freight and commuter railroads have raised concerns about their ability to meet the deadline 
imposed by Congress. In the 112th Congress, measures to relax the deadline were approved by the 
Senate and by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, but were not included in 
the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), the surface 
transportation bill signed by President Obama on July 6, 2012. The U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) is required to submit a report to Congress about the status of PTC 
implementation and possible risk mitigation options by December 31, 2012. 
Rail Safety and PTC 
The United States railroad network comprises both freight and passenger operations. The seven 
largest operators by revenue, known as the Class I freight railroads, own about two-thirds of the 
nation’s 140,810 miles of trackage (see Figure 1).1 These companies include BNSF, Union 
Pacific (UP), Norfolk Southern (NS), Kansas City Southern (KCS), Canadian Pacific (CP), 
Canadian National (CN), and CSX Transportation (CSXT). The remaining trackage is controlled 
by Class II or regional freight railroads; Class III or short-line railroads; state and local 
government agencies; and Amtrak, the federally owned passenger operator. 
In many situations, both passenger and freight railroad companies operate over track owned by 
other railroads. This may occur under orders issued by the federal Surface Transportation Board 
or under voluntary agreements between carriers. Amtrak also has the right to operate trains using 
its own equipment over freight lines.2 
The majority of freight railroad lines have a single track with passing sidings at various locations 
to allow trains to pass. Trains may operate in either direction along a track. High-volume 
corridors may have multiple lines that typically operate in a single direction to increase both 
operating capacity and safety.3 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Transportation, “National Transportation Statistics,” http://www.bts.gov/publications/
national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_01.html. 
2 See CRS Report R42512, Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad Track, by John Frittelli. 
3 Cambridge Systematics, National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study, Final Report, 
September 2007, p. 25, http://www.aar.org/~/media/aar/Files/natl_freight_capacity_study.ashx. 
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 2 
For safety purposes, train dispatchers and signals along the track provide the engineer with the 
authority to travel on a certain track segment to prevent collision with other trains. Some long 
stretches of track in remote areas use only one main line without any signalization. This is called 
“dark territory.” In this case, railroads rely on communications with dispatchers to provide 
authority. Dispatchers are also responsible for assigning priority when more than one train 
requires use of a particular segment of track. 
Figure 1. National Network of Class I Railroads 
 
Source: Cambridge Systematics, Inc., National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study, 
September 2007. 
Note: This map shows the Class I railroads in the United States. Not all lines shown are subject to the PTC 
implementation mandate. 
According to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), an average of 2,000 derailments and 
205 train collisions, resulting in 422 injuries and 12 fatalities, occurred annually from 1998 to 
2009, excluding accidents at highway-rail crossings.4 The number of incidents may increase as 
operations in both freight and passenger rail expand, despite a reduction in total track length. 
However, the majority of train-related fatalities are due to interactions with vehicular traffic at 
highway-grade crossings or trespassing on railroad property rather than train collisions or 
derailments. In 2009, 4 fatalities occurred from train collisions or derailments, 247 fatalities 
occurred at highway-rail grade crossings, and 417 fatalities resulted from trespassing on railroad 
property or right-of-way.5 
                                                 
4 Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Railroad Safety Statistics, Annual Report, April 1, 2011, pp. 4-20. 
5 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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While most incidents are minor, several high-profile accidents led Congress to consider increased 
rail safety. Most notably, the head-on collision of a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific 
freight train in Chatsworth, CA, led to 25 fatalities and over 100 injuries in 2008. The cause of 
the crash was determined to be negligence by the commuter train engineer. PTC was specifically 
identified by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as a technology that could have 
prevented Chatsworth and other similar accidents by providing a safeguard against human error.6 
Interest in PTC dates to at least 1990, when the NTSB placed it on its initial “Most Wanted List 
of Transportation Safety Improvements.”7 The High-Speed Rail Development Act of 1994 
directed FRA to issue a progress report on positive train control. In 2004, FRA submitted a cost-
benefit analysis of PTC at the request of Congress.8 That study showed that as of 2004, the costs 
of PTC outweighed the direct safety benefits, but the agency’s letter to Congress stated, “we 
believe PTC will be more affordable in the future.”9 
The Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2007, introduced in the 110th Congress, 
mandated implementation of PTC in specific circumstances.10 The Chatsworth train accident on 
September 12, 2008, expedited the legislative process, and the bill was signed into law October 
16, 2008, as the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08). RSIA08 requires “each 
Class I railroad carrier and each entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail 
passenger transportation” to implement PTC on all segments or routes of railroad tracks that (a) 
carry frequent passenger or commuter service, or (b) carry more than 5 million gross tons of 
freight per year and also are used for transporting poison-by-inhalation hazardous materials 
(PIH).11 At the time the law was signed, this mandate covered approximately 70,000 miles of 
railroad track. 
During the FRA rulemaking process, it became apparent that rail companies could change the 
routes of trains carrying PIH to avoid the PTC requirement on some track segments. A Senate bill 
was introduced to forego mandatory PTC implementation on lines that will not be transporting 
passengers or hazardous materials by the end of 2015.12 This was estimated to eliminate the PTC 
mandate on 10,000 of the 70,000 track-miles initially covered. The bill was not enacted, but FRA 
approved such a change in its amended final rule, effective July 13, 2012.13 The American Short 
Line and Regional Railroad Association proposed several changes to the FRA final rule, including 
eliminating the PTC requirement for trains traveling less than 20 miles on PTC-required track and 
                                                 
6 National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Metrolink Train 111 With Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 
Chatsworth, California, RAR 10/01, September 12, 2008. 
7 National Transportation Safety Board, Office of Public Affairs, “NTSB unveils new ‘Most Wanted List,’” press 
release, June 23, 2011, p. 1, http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2011/110623.html. 
8 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report on the Consolidate Appropriations 
Resolution, To accompany H.J.Res. 2, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, H.Rept. 108-10 (Washington: GPO, 2003), pp. 
1286-1287. 
9 Letter from Betty Monro, Federal Railroad Administration Acting Administrator, to Sen. Robert Byrd, Ranking 
Member, Committee on Appropriations, August 17, 2004, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/
ptc_ben_cost_report.pdf. 
10 H.R. 2095, S. 1889. 
11 P.L. 110-432, §104. 
12 S. 301, 112th Congress. 
13 Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Systems Amendments (RRR),” 76 Federal Register 52918, 
August 24, 2011. 
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extending the deadline for Class II and III railroads to employ PTC-equipped locomotives until 
2020. FRA approved these changes in an amended final rule.14 
In the 112th Congress, bills to delay the PTC implementation deadline were considered in both 
houses of Congress. As approved by the Senate, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st 
Century Act (MAP-21; S. 1813) would have allowed DOT to extend the December 31, 2015, 
deadline for any railroad in one-year increments until December 31, 2018, if it deemed full 
implementation infeasible and if the railroad had made a good-faith effort to comply. The bill 
would have allowed use of Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF)15 for PTC 
implementation. 
The American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012 (H.R. 7), which was adopted by the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee but was not approved by the House of 
Representatives, would have extended the deadline for PTC implementation to December 31, 
2020, and would have allowed railroads to adjust PIH routes until 2020 to reduce the extent of 
track affected by the PTC mandate. The bill also would have allowed railroads to implement 
alternative strategies on track that does not transport passengers where the “alternative risk 
reduction strategy that would reduce the risk of release of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation 
hazardous materials to the same extent the risk of a release of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation 
hazardous materials would be reduced if positive train control were installed on those tracks.”16 
While the provision would have allowed flexibility on the part of the railroads, alternative safety 
measures might interfere with the goal of interoperability and could raise costs for smaller 
railroads that might need to conform to multiple safety systems. 
The final version of the 2012 surface transportation bill, signed by President Obama on July 6, 
2012, as P.L. 112-141, did not change existing law concerning PTC. However, the issue remains 
of interest to Congress. As required by RSIA08, DOT must report on PTC implementation to the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Senate Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Committee by December 31, 2012. 
The Basics of PTC 
PTC is defined in federal law as a “system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over-
speed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train 
through a switch left in the wrong position.”17 The federal government has imposed no specific 
technical requirements, allowing railroads to adopt whatever PTC systems seem best suited to 
their particular needs. However, all PTC systems share certain characteristics, including use of 
radio communication to provide in-cab signals to the train engineer and the ability for the 
dispatcher to stop a train in an emergency.18  
                                                 
14 Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Systems,” 75 Federal Register 2704, January 15, 2010. 
15 Railroad Reinvestment and Improvement Funding (RRIF) provides direct loans and loan guarantees up to a total of 
$35 billion to improve or develop new rail equipment and facilities, and refinance outstanding debt. 
16 H.R. 7, §8401, p. 805. 
17 49 C.F.R. §236. 
18 Federal Railroad Administration, The North American Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Project, Research 
Results, April 2009, p. 2. 
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 5 
Most U.S. railroads currently plan to implement what is referred to as an “overlay-type” system, 
in which the sensors, signals, and transponders are installed over existing track.19 The network 
operating center sends one-way communication in the form of speed restrictions and moving 
authorities to a train as it passes over a transponder embedded in the track. This information 
requires integration with existing signals, switches, sensors, and other wayside infrastructure. The 
network operating office does not track real-time train location, but rather receives notice 
whenever a train passes the wayside infrastructure. Figure 2 illustrates PTC hardware and 
communication pathways in an overlay-type system architecture. 
Figure 2. Example PTC System Architecture 
 
Source: Meteorcomm LLC, ETMS Wireless Network, 2011. 
Note: Meteorcomm supplies communication equipment for the Electronic Train Management System (ETMS), 
which several large freight companies are planning to implement. This diagram shows a two-way communications 
based PTC system, although most railroads are installing one-way systems that comply with the law.  
                                                 
19 Jeff D. Young, Lisa C. Wilson, and Denise E. Lyle, Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) 
Positive Train Control Development Plan (PTCDP), Union Pacific Railroad, Norfolk Southern Railway, and CSX 
Transportation, Inc, FRA-2010-0060-0002, June 1, 2011. 
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Communication between wayside infrastructure, transponders, and trains is delivered through 
analog radio signal. Wireless communication options that provide greater data transfer capability, 
such as Wi-Fi, are not currently practical. Equipment on the train receives information from 
transponders to alert the train operator to current and upcoming signals, movements, and work 
zones. The train has equipment capable of superseding train engineer authority, so that the PTC 
system can slow or stop the train to prevent incident in the event of human error.  
A more expansive variant of an overlay-type system is communications-based train control 
(CBTC). CBTC is a more sophisticated computer-aided dispatching framework which requires 
train information to be sent to a central location, which then disseminates the information to all 
entities in the network.20 In this architecture, Global Positioning System (GPS) is used to track 
train location and speed, with other instrumentation providing location and speed coverage when 
the GPS cannot locate a signal. These additional components provide greater precision as well as 
system redundancy in the event of failure. Similarly, GPS and radio communication similar to cell 
phone technology can be used to indentify work zone locations along specific lengths of track. 
CBTC is based on digital rather than analog technology, facilitating interoperability among 
systems used by different railroads. 
With CBTC, central control automatically tracks the movements of all the trains in the network, 
sends speed restrictions and movement authorities to individual trains, and checks for potential 
derailment and collisions (see Figure 3). The system uses location and speed information to 
determine headway distance and the necessary braking distance required to prevent potential 
incidents. Braking distance can be several miles for large freight trains and is dependent on 
factors such as train speed, reaction time, wheel-rail friction, brakes wear, track conditions, track 
grading, mass, and mass distribution of the train.21 All these variables are processed with a 
complex braking algorithm to ensure an emergency stop prior to a collision without excessive 
speed restriction leading to inefficient operation. 
The greater capability of CBTC makes it suitable for very high speed passenger lines, and CBTC 
is being instituted on some European rail lines for that reason. However, the system requires 
seamless communication coverage along the entirety of PTC-equipped track, as temporary 
communication loss can pose safety risks. The need for constant communication also requires 
significant investment in either radio towers or fixed transponders. These requirements raise the 
capital cost, making CBTC more expensive than an overlay-type system. 
                                                 
20 There are many ways of designing the system architecture to support PTC communication. In the context of railroad 
operations with dispatchers, a system architecture with central control is the most plausible design. 
21 David Barney, David Haley, and George Nikandros, “Calculating Train Braking Distance,” This paper appeared at 
the 6th Australian Workshop on Safety Critical Systems and Software (SCS ‘01), Brisbane, 2001, pp. 23-29, 
http://129.96.12.107/confpapers/CRPITV3Barney.pdf. 
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Figure 3. Communication-based Train Control (CBTC) 
 
Source: Federal Railroad Administration, Research Results, North American Joint Train Control (NAJTC) 
Project, April 2009 
Note: Two-way data communication and computer-aided dispatch are the primary subsystems which distinguish 
full CBTC from PTC. 
The CBTC system potentially offers greater business benefits to railroad operators than an 
overlay-type system. For example, the real-time, two-way communication of train locations 
combined with speed restrictions and moving authorities can lead to more efficient scheduling, 
increased capacity, and fuel savings. Nonetheless, U.S. railroads appear to have concluded that 
the advantages of communication-based train control are not worth the additional cost of 
installing it at the present time. 
It is important to note that both overlay-type systems and CBTC systems are designed principally 
to reduce collisions between trains. The systems do not address intrusion into railroad right-of-
way. Currently, there is no requirement that they be capable of detecting and notifying trains 
about crossing-gate failures, vehicles blocking tracks, or trespassers. However, such capabilities 
could be incorporated into PTC systems in the future.  
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 8 
Implementation 
Motivated by the December 31, 2015, deadline, many of the large railroad companies are 
currently testing and implementing PTC on selected track segments across the United States. 
There are also several small-scale projects underway designed to meet specific local needs. Most 
of the current PTC projects rely on fixed transponders in conjunction with GPS with one-way 
information communication to the trains to fulfill the baseline PTC requirements. Only a few 
systems involve two-way communication with real-time information and computer-aided 
dispatch. The smaller railroad companies and commuter lines, in most cases, are relying on the 
Class I railroads to implement PTC before investing in their own systems due to the high risk and 
the cost of developing their own systems. 
In the United States, precursors to full PTC capability were developed voluntarily prior to the 
2008 mandate. Development of radio-based CBTC systems and coordinated wayside systems 
used to locate and communicate with trains began in 1983. Although systems developed by the 
Association of American Railroads and Burlington Northern Railroad achieved technical success, 
both systems were functional only in fully signalized territory and were deemed not economically 
viable to deploy on a nationwide scale. 
In 1991, Amtrak adopted an automatic train control (ATC) system along the tracks it owns in the 
Northeast Corridor. That system repeated signalization in the cab and required the train engineer 
to acknowledge and enforce the speed limit given by the signals to reduce human error. That 
system was later upgraded with the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, using 
transponders to send signals to trains and to enforce speed restrictions and stop orders.22 Amtrak 
began transitioning to radio-based communication in 2009 to incorporate work zone safety 
measures required by RSIA08.23 
In 1999, CSX Transportation began development of a PTC system that uses GPS combined with 
fixed infrastructure at switching points to provide exact track location information, specifically on 
parallel lines. This method is particularly useful to improve safety on long stretches of non-
signalized track. CSXT is now modifying this architecture to meet the full requirements of PTC. 
BNSF, Union Pacific, Norfolk Southern, and Chicago’s Metra commuter line are planning 
implementation of similar systems. Norfolk Southern’s system is expected to provide for 
computer-aided dispatch over small segments of track.24 
Prior to certification and revenue service, each rail company is required to submit to FRA a PTC 
Implementation Plan (PTCIP), Development Plan (PTCDP), and Safety Plan (PTCSP) and 
receive approval for each plan in that order. Companies can also receive “type” approvals when 
using an identical PTC system that has already received approval. This process and 
implementation of the plans must be completed prior to the deadline of December 31, 2015. 
                                                 
22 James Hoelscher and Larry Light, “Full PTC Today with Off the Shelf Technology: Amtrak’s ACSES Overlay on 
Expanded ATC,” Proceedings of the 2001 AREMA Conference, Chicago, IL, 2001, http://www.arema.org/files/library/
2001_Conference_Proceedings/00022.pdf. 
23 Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Overview,” press release, February 2, 2009, p. 1, 
http://www.fra.dot.gov/rrs/pages/fp_1265.shtml. 
24 William Vantuono, “Two new technologies ready to roll,” International Railway Journal, vol. 48, no. 4 (April 2008), 
pp. 26-28. 
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As of June 2012, nearly all PTCIPs have been received. The PTCDP for the system planned for 
use by UP, CSXT, BNSF, NS, and some other railroads has been approved. Very few other 
railroads have reached the PTCDP stage, but many can be expected to use the larger railroads’ 
type approvals for their own individual plans. Only one PTCSP for a relatively small railroad has 
been submitted. As a result of this process, only a very small portion of required trackage 
currently has PTC infrastructure installed. 
Cost and Benefits 
FRA estimates the total capital cost of wayside, on-board, radio, and office equipment necessary 
for full PTC deployment on all affected railroads to be in excess of $10 billion. It projects annual 
maintenance costs of $850 million.25 In 2010, fixed-capital investment by U.S. railroads was $11 
billion, of which $7.8 billion went for structures and $3.2 billion for equipment.26 The estimated 
capital cost of meeting the PTC mandate is thus roughly equal to the railroads’ total capital 
spending in a single year. 
The four largest railroad companies account for almost all of the estimated 60,000 miles of Class 
I track that fall under the PTC mandate. In August 2010, two railroads (CSXT and NS) estimated 
costs of PTC alone to be over $1.2 billion each.27  
Smaller freight companies often share track with the Class I railroads. While this presents 
interoperability challenges, there is opportunity to use the PTC type approvals from the larger 
companies’ development efforts to save cost. This is also the case with shared passenger rail in 
the Northeast Corridor. Despite this advantage, the infrastructure cost alone for just two of the 
five largest transit agencies operating on the corridor, Metro-North in the New York area and the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority in the Philadelphia area, is estimated at $350 
million and $100 million, respectively.28  
Commuter railroads’ cost for installing PTC is likely to be borne primarily by state or local 
governments. FRA established a railroad safety technology grant fund to support railroads’ 
development and implementation of PTC systems, with $50 million budgeted for each FY2009-
FY2013.29 However, no funds have been appropriated for this program. 
Some shippers believe that since the majority of the investment in PTC will come directly from 
the railroad companies, these costs will likely be passed to customers. They expect price increases 
due to the cost of PTC implementation, especially if the rail companies are unable to realize 
business benefits from the new systems. The Chlorine Institute, a trade organization representing 
                                                 
25 Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-
0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, p. 120. 
26 U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Annual Capital Expenditures Survey, http://www.census.gov/econ/aces/xls/2010/
full_report.html, Table 4a. 
27 CSX Transportation, CSX Corporation 2010 Annual Report, Jacksonville, FL, 2010, p. 6; Thompson Reuters, NSC - 
Q1 2010 Norfolk Southern Corp Earnings, Conference Call Final Transcript, April 27, 2010, p. 19, 
http://www.nscorp.com/nscorphtml/pdf/transcript042710.pdf. 
28 Jeff Stagl, “PTC: Railroads, suppliers still have a ways to go to meet the 2015 positive train control mandate,” 
Progressive Railroading, August 2010. 
29 U.S. Department of Transportation, “FRA Announces $50 Million Safety Technology Grant Program,” press release, 
April 7, 2010, http://www.fra.dot.gov/Pages/press-releases/201.shtml. 
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the chlorine industry, expects the railroad companies to raise costs disproportionately for 
shipments of poisonous-by-inhalation hazardous materials (PIH), as concern about the safety of 
PIH transport is perceived as a source of the PTC mandate.30 
Safety Benefits from PTC Preventable Accidents 
Based on analysis of past PTC preventable accidents, FRA estimates $90 million in annual safety 
benefits will be realized after full implementation of PTC.31 Safety benefits are calculated by 
estimating the cost of accidents that are likely to be prevented by PTC, including fatalities and 
injuries, equipment damage, track damage, off-track damage, hazardous material cleanup, 
evacuations, wreck cleanup, loss of freight, and freight delay. According to a 1999 FRA estimate, 
between 1987 and 1997 an annual average of 7 fatalities, 22 injuries, $20 million in property 
damages, and evacuations of 150 people due to potential hazardous material release could have 
been prevented by PTC.32  
Although many serious incidents due to error by train engineers or dispatchers could be prevented 
by PTC, PTC is expected to prevent less than 2% of the approximately 2,000 railroad collisions 
and derailments that occur annually. The majority of these 2,000 incidents occur in rail yards and 
are generally less severe than PTC-preventable accidents.  
While the costs and safety benefits are projected with some confidence, there is disagreement 
regarding the potential business and social benefits of PTC. This makes a full cost-benefit 
analysis of PTC-related issues difficult. Business and social benefits are expected to come from 
increased railroad efficiency, reductions in logistical costs, and diversion of freight from truck to 
rail. However, these benefits are predicated on the functionality of full computer-based train 
control and not PTC alone. Computer-aided dispatch has the potential to increase capacity and 
reduce fuel consumption. This can reduce railroad operating costs, lead to faster, less-expensive 
delivery, and induce demand from truck freight. This then may lead to social benefits such as 
reductions in fuel consumption and truck accidents.  
FRA projects $4 billion in potential annual business benefits a decade after full PTC 
implementation. However, the overlay system without CBTC capability currently planned by the 
railroads is expected to offer little or no business benefit to the railroads. The social benefits of 
the overlay system are likely to come largely from the anticipated reduction in accidents.33 
                                                 
30 The Chlorine Institute, Inc, “Chlorine Institute Asks Federal Rail Administration to Reconsider Positive Train 
Control Rule Due to Faulty Cost-Benefit Analysis,” press release, March 16, 2010, http://www.chlorineinstitute.org/
files/PDFs/2010-03-16%20-%20CI%20PTC%20petition.pdf. 
31 Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-
0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. 140-144. 
32 Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, Federal Railroad Administration, Implementation of Positive Train Control 
Systems, Report, August 1999, https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/19990908.php. 
33 Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-
0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. A-1-A-16. 
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Policy Issues  
Interoperability 
The freight rail transportation network has two primary components: the track and the freight 
service. In some cases, the service is provided by the same company that owns the track. 
However, since shippers’ needs do not correspond to railroads’ track ownership, freight operators 
trade trackage or haulage rights and share revenue from the shipper. FRA regulations require that 
railroads’ PTC systems be interoperable so that any train operating on PTC-equipped track can 
communicate with the host railroad’s PTC system.  
Prior to RSIA08, several railroad companies were developing communication-based train control 
independently for their own business reasons, and were not concerned about interoperability. The 
federal mandate has required changes in these plans in the interest of interoperability. UP, CSXT, 
and NS have received FRA “type approvals” for Interoperable Electronic Train Management 
Systems (I-ETMS) in which the PTC system itself is approved for development.34 This makes it 
likely that the systems installed by these railroads will be highly compatible. BNSF, which has a 
precursor ETMS system in place, has type approval for that system, which is to be updated to I-
ETMS when software becomes available. 
Interoperability issues pertain to passenger service as well. In the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak 
operates on Amtrak-owned track and track owned by regional transit authorities and vice versa. 
Figure 4 illustrates the necessity for interoperable PTC systems to prevent disruption in service. 
Amtrak began PTC development prior to RSIA08 and has provided the PTC standard and type 
approval for transit authorities utilizing the corridor. The freight companies and Amtrak are now 
working to ensure interoperability between their respective systems. 
                                                 
34 Letter from Jo Strang, FRA Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, to Jeff D. Young et al., 
Union Pacific Railroad Assistant Vice President, Transportation System, August 26, 2011, FRA Type Approval (FRA-
TA-2011-02) for the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS). 
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 12 
Figure 4. Track Ownership and Rail Operations in the Northeast Corridor 
 
Source: Government Accountability Office, GAO—06-470, Commuter Rail Issues Should Be Considered in Debate 
Over Amtrak, April 2006. 
Communication Spectrum 
One aspect of interoperability involves the communications links between wayside equipment, 
locomotive, and the network office. Various types of equipment owned by many different 
railroads must be able to communicate on any track equipped with PTC. It would be most 
efficient to utilize a single radio frequency band across the entire PTC system to minimize the 
cost of radio receivers and network equipment, although a system with multiple frequencies is 
possible.  
The radio frequency band to be used for communication must be known prior to equipment 
purchases. PTC-220 LLC, a consortium of the Union Pacific, Norfolk Southern, CSX, and BNSF 
railroads, has purchased licenses to some frequencies in the 220 MHz range,35 and is requesting 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to reassign additional spectrum in the 220 MHz 
band to the railroads for the purpose of PTC. The FCC has designated spectrum in the 220 MHz 
range mainly for commercial uses and has auctioned licenses to various parties.  
                                                 
35 Spectrum is segmented into bands of radio frequencies and typically measured in cycles per second, or hertz. 
Standard abbreviations for measuring frequencies include kHz—kilohertz or thousands of hertz; MHz—megahertz, or 
millions of hertz; and GHz—gigahertz, or billions of hertz. 
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Furthermore, along with Amtrak and other railroads, the consortium has requested additional 217-
222 MHz spectrum and appropriate license and rule changes, claiming 220 MHz will be 
insufficient in congested areas.36 Although frequencies may be available in various bands, the 
railroads prefer the 217-222 MHz range due to compatibility with current infrastructure and the 
radio communication technology they have chosen to employ (I-ETMS).37 Because of uncertainty 
over spectrum needs, the FCC issued a public notice seeking comments from stakeholders on 
May 5, 2011, but has not instituted a formal rulemaking process regarding PTC radio spectrum 
issues.38 
The railroads’ requests for dedicated spectrum for PTC raise a number of policy issues. Licenses 
to much of the spectrum requested by the railroads have been purchased by other entities in FCC 
auctions. While the FCC is empowered to reallocate spectrum if necessary for public safety, 
reassignment for PTC would effectively represent a forced transfer of licenses from some private 
parties to others. In comments submitted to the FCC, some current licensees of spectrum in the 
218-219 MHz range asserted that it is unfair to reallocate spectrum to which they have purchased 
rights in a competitive bidding process. They also believe the railroads have identified 220 MHz 
as the core spectrum for PTC without sufficient investigation into their specific radio 
communication needs or possible alternatives. They contend the railroads can lease spectrum 
from primary license holders without FCC action.39  
The railroads counter that leasing spectrum for PTC from existing license holders could raise 
their costs by creating captive demand for a limited amount of spectrum. A related problem stems 
from the fact that some of the railroads required to install PTC are commuter lines owned by state 
or local government agencies. These agencies may have difficulty raising the funds to obtain 
desirable frequencies in competitive auctions; indeed, the FCC normally assigns frequencies to 
government agencies at no cost. 
Avoiding Barriers to Market Entry 
There are several ways the PTC mandate could be used as a barrier to market entry for the 
railroads. First, installing track will now be more expensive due to the need to incorporate PTC 
wayside equipment, which is expected to add approximately $50,000 per mile to the $1 million to 
$3 million per mile cost of installing new rail lines. On-board PTC equipment is expected to cost 
around $55,000 per locomotive, which represents only a minor increase in the cost of a new $2 
million locomotive but is substantial compared to the $75,000 cost of used locomotives operated 
                                                 
36 Association of American Railroads, Comments of Association of American Railroads, Federal Communications 
Commission, WT Docket No. 11-79, June 20, 2011, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021688770. 
37 It should be noted that the radio communication supplier for ETMS is MeteorComm, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
BNSF, and BNSF is a member of PTC-220, LLC. MeteorComm, “MeteorComm™ Powers BNSF’s Electronic Train 
Management Communications,” press release, January 19, 2007, http://meteorcomm.com/downloads/
MCC_PSPApproval.pdf. 
38 Federal Communications Commission, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Spectrum Needs 
for the Implementation of the Positive Train Control Provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, WT 
Docket No. 11-79, Washington, D.C., May 5, 2011, http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-
838A1.pdf. 
39 The Coalition of 218-219 MHz Service Licensees, Reply Comments of The Coalition of 218-219 MHz Licensees, 
Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 11-79, July 11, 2011, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs//document/
view.action?id=7021691731. 
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by some short line railroads.40 In addition to capital costs, operating and maintenance costs will 
increase as well.41 This could be a barrier to both railroad expansion and startup services. 
Another barrier to market entry could arise through the need for interoperability and spectrum 
compatibility. Hypothetically, if two rail networks have different PTC systems because they do 
not currently share track or services, it may be cost prohibitive to implement a new service over 
these two lines. Similarly, one company could upgrade or modify its PTC system, forcing further 
investment by other companies using its track. Also, if the radio spectrum licenses are owned by 
certain railroads or a consortium of railroads, they could dictate leasing prices to operate 
necessary PTC systems on that spectrum for a new railroad or service which is not part of the 
consortium. Control of spectrum and interoperability issues with PTC could be used as tools to 
prevent new services on existing lines or even using an interoperable spectrum on new lines.  
The possibility that PTC could impede competition may be of particular concern for short line 
and regional railroads which operate on Class I track. Class I railroads have a legal obligation to 
accommodate short line railroads, but in some cases may be reluctant to allow short line trains on 
their networks.42 The president of the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
issued the following testimony to the Surface Transportation Board: 
Differential pricing of certain routes or products by class I carriers ... ha[s] eliminated 
marginal customers who may be a small railroad’s only source of business on its line, 
effectively putting the small railroad out of business. Some small railroads who want to 
provide service to new customers meet resistance from connecting carriers whose marketing 
plans are inconsistent with the small railroad’s proposed business.43  
At this point, concerns that PTC could create barriers to railroad competition are hypothetical, as 
no specific complaints are known to have been presented to FRA or to the Surface Transportation 
Board, which oversees certain rail competition issues. 
2015 Implementation Deadline  
It remains uncertain whether all affected railroads will be able to comply with the December 31, 
2015, deadline for implementing PTC. Many railroads continue to argue that the large capital 
expenditures required over a small period will divert funding from other uses, including 
investment in improving the safety of highway-rail grade crossings, where most train-related 
accidents and fatalities occur.44  
                                                 
40 Federal Railroad Administration, “Positive Train Control Systems Amendments (RRR),” 77 Federal Register 28285, 
May 14, 2012. 
41 Frank D. Roskind, Positive Train Control Systems Economic Analysis, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA-2006-
0132, Notice No. 1, July 10, 2009, pp. 115-116. 
42 CRS Report RL34117, Railroad Access and Competition Issues, by John Frittelli. 
43 Richard F. Timmons, STB Ex Parte No. 677: Common Carrier Obligation Hearing, American Short Line and 
Regional Railroad Association, Testimony of Richard F. Timmons, Washington, DC, April 25, 2008, p. 2. 
44 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rail Safety - Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the 
Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology, GAO-11-133, December 2010, p. 25. 
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The effect of the deadline on installation of more advanced systems is disputed. As discussed 
earlier, PTC and CBTC have different capabilities, but they share similar infrastructure and 
communication architectures. While CBTC would require additional cost, it might be cost-
effective to develop both functionalities simultaneously. Railroads also argue the deadline for 
PTC has caused railroads to focus on that system rather than on the potential business advantages 
of a broader CBTC system.45 Also, some commuter lines have stated interest in extending PTC 
capability through wireless technology capable of transmitting more data, but investment in these 
more complex emerging technologies may be deferred due to the approaching deadline.46  
On the other hand, the PTC mandate institutes a common infrastructure and communication 
architecture platform that could be used for future CBTC and additional safety feature integration 
in a coordinated way across disparate stakeholders. Without the PTC mandate it is likely that 
PTC/CBTC would not have been developed with such a coordinated effort, due to the multitude 
of stakeholders. FRA has concluded that incremental steps are the preferred way to develop a 
more complex train control system, such as CBTC.47 
Options for Congress 
The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; S. 1813) and the American 
Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act (H.R. 7) from the 112th Congress both included provisions 
which amended RSIA08 with respect to PTC. The provisions in these bills were ultimately 
excluded from the final version of the transportation bill (H.R. 4348), but both provide insight 
into possible strategies to address some of the policy issues with PTC. 
Table 1. PTC Provisions in Unenacted Senate and House Bills in 112th Congress 
Bill 
Deadline 
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report on 
spectrum needs 















Source: CRS, based on texts of S. 1813 and H.R. 7. 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Jeff Stagl, “PTC: Railroads, suppliers still have a ways to go to meet the 2015 positive train control mandate,” 
Progressive Railroading, August 2010. 
47 Federal Railroad Administration, The North American Joint Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Project, Research 
Results, April 2009, p. 4. 
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Congress has already shown its concern about implementation risk, and the enacted version of 
MAP-21 requires DOT to report on PTC implementation to Congress by December 31, 2012. The 
Government Accountability Office has recommended that this report include “an analysis of (1) 
the likelihood that railroads will meet the PTC implementation deadline; (2) the risks to 
successful implementation of PTC; and (3) actions Congress, railroads, or other stakeholders can 
take to mitigate risks to successful PTC implementation.”48 
The most obvious way to mitigate implementation risk would be to extend the 2015 deadline, 
giving railroads and FRA additional time to make sure PTC will work as intended. S. 1813 and 
H.R. 7 both would have extended the deadline, albeit in different ways. However, extending the 
deadline would create a different sort of risk by leaving railroads exposed to PTC-preventable 
accidents for a longer period of time. 
One of the major concerns of railroad companies is the cost of PTC. This is especially true for 
short line railroads and local commuter services reliant on local and state government funds. 
RSIA08 authorizes federal grants to railroads to support PTC, but no funds have been 
appropriated for this purpose. Congress could address this issue by specifically making PTC 
projects eligible for funding under the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Funding 
Program, as provided in S. 1813, or by appropriating other funding to FRA. 
Congress may wish to consider issues related to spectrum allocation for PTC. S. 1813 called for a 
joint FCC/DOT investigation of spectrum issues, but no such directive has been enacted. While 
the FCC has solicited comments about the use of spectrum for PTC, it has not instituted a formal 
proceeding and is not required by law to do so. Congress could establish deadlines or direct FCC 
actions on the subject. Alternatively, by not acting, Congress could choose to leave the matter 
entirely to the FCC’s discretion. 
Although many more rail-related fatalities occur at highway-rail crossings than from train 
collisions, these are not specifically addressed in the PTC mandate of RSIA08. Congress could 
address this by extending the definition of PTC to require coverage of highway-rail crossings. 
This can be achieved technically within the PTC framework by installing sensors at crossings that 
would engage the brakes of an oncoming train if a crossing gate were not working properly or if a 
vehicle is detected on the tracks.49 While this may require further investment on the part of the 
railroads and may not be implementable by the current deadline, it may offer more significant 
gains in terms of safety than train collision prevention alone. 
 
                                                 
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rail Safety - Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the 
Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology, GAO-11-133, December 2010, p. 47. 
49 Fred Coleman III, Ronald W. Eck, and Eugene R. Russell, “Railroad-Highway Grade Crossings,” TRB Conference 
Publication, Washington, DC, January 2000. 
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